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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S MONITORING
MECHANISMS AND THEIR RELATION TO
EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES'
NONCOMPLIANCE
Vessela V. Stoyanova*
I. INTRODUCTION
We shall never build a better Europe if we cannot dream
of a better Europe.!
Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic
Following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe,
the Council of Europe ("Council of Europe" or "Council")2
opened its doors to most of the countries situated in Eastern
Europe. While these states have been quite eager to obtain
membership and thus join the ranks of their Western Euro-
pean counterparts, they have experienced substantial prob-
lems meeting the obligations that membership in the Council
entails.3 Although much has been said about the bearing of
internal conditions specific to each individual state on
whether that state fulfills its commitments,4 little attention
has been devoted to the practices of the Council of Europe it-
self and the aggravating effect some of these practices have
* Editor-in-Chief, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A. International Relations, Stanford Univer-
sity.
1. Vaclav Havel, Address to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France
(May 10, 1990), transcript available at
http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/1005_uk.html (last visited Apr.
16, 2005).
2. See infra Part II.A; see generally A. H. ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE: ITS STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (2nd ed. 1961) (pro-
viding a detailed overview of the Council of Europe).
3. See infra Part II.B.1, II.C.
4. See infra Part I.C.
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on the Eastern European countries' violation of their mem-
bership obligations.
This comment concedes that a myriad of factors exist
that contribute to a state's noncompliance and a large portion
of those factors originate within the violating state itself. In-
stead, this comment focuses on identifying factors not origi-
nating within the violating state that play a role in the prob-
lem of noncompliance and then proposes ways to address
their negative impact.
Part II of this comment provides a brief introduction to
how the Council of Europe operates.' It commences with an
overview of the Council's workings,6 followed by a closer ex-
amination of the organization's monitoring mechanisms.7 The
latter examination includes a glimpse at what gives rise to
the need to monitor the Eastern European states,8 a descrip-
tion of the legal and political monitoring and the respective
organs that conduct it, and the several different kinds of
monitoring that states undergo.9 Part II also presents the ex-
ample of one Eastern European country as an illustration of
the problem of noncompliance with the Council's rules."
Part III of this comment identifies why an examination of
the Council's monitoring mechanisms needs to be made be-
cause of Eastern European states' noncompliance with the
Council's norms.11 Part IV explores the idea that the struc-
ture and practices of the Council of Europe are partially re-
sponsible for the observed phenomenon of noncompliance by
examining in turn the implications of the lack of true partici-
pation by the Eastern European countries in the making of
Council rules, 2 and the mixed messages the Council of
Europe sends to the Eastern European states by virtue of the
duplication of its procedures" and the application of double
standards.' Finally, Part V outlines some steps the Council
may consider undertaking to address the problem of noncom-
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
9. See infra Part II.B.2.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. See infra Part IV.B.1.
14. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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pliance."
II. BACKGROUND
In the course of the last few decades, it has become fash-
ionable to speak about Europe as a unified entity on its way
to a structural unit resembling the United States. 6 The vi-
sion of a unified Europe, however, is anything but new, al-
though it has enjoyed new prominence in the wake of World
War II.7 History abounds with past examples of failed at-
tempts to give flesh to this vision. From the Roman Empire
epoch, Napoleon's reign, and most recently with Hitler's aspi-
rations for dominion over the continent, there are numerous
examples attesting to the power of the captivating, though
highly elusive, notion of "One Europe."18
In response to the devastation brought about by World
War II, the vision of a unified Europe was resurrected with a
new meaning. 9 This time, it was cast in the light of coopera-
tion and interdependency aimed at preventing future con-
flicts.2" The notion that interdependency was the key to last-
ing peace was a recurrent theme in the creation of the
Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community,
the European Economic Community, and the European Un-
ion.2 The "United States of Europe," as Winston Churchill
15. See infra Part V.
16. See, e.g., JERZY JASKIERNIA, THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 17-18 (Information Office of the Council of Europe, War-
saw trans., 2003). One of the concepts considered at the time for organizing
post-World War II European order was as a "federation modelled [sic] on the
United States which would require relinquishing some of the state sovereignty
of its member states in favour of the federation." Id. at 23.
17. See, e.g., Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Hu-
man Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement, 8
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313,313-14 (1998).
18. See Evropeiskata ideya ot Cezar do Hitler The European Idea from
Caesar to Hitler], BANKER (Bulgaria), Jan. 17, 2004, at 19 (translated by au-
thor) (on file with author). The article also quotes French writer Victor Hugo,
chairman of the Congress of Friends of Peace in Paris, in 1849 addressing an
appeal to create the United States of Europe: "'[t]he day will come when you,
France, you, Russia, you, Italy, you, Germany, all of you, European nations,
without losing your glorious individualities, will unite yourselves into some-
thing much greater.'" Id.; see also JASKIERNIA, supra note 16, at 17.
19. See Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 313-14.
20. See id. See generally PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1-14 (LexisNexis 2003).
21. See Interview with L.J. Sharpe, Fellow Emeritus in Politics, Nuffield
College, University of Oxford, in Oxford, England (Nov. 2000) (on file with au-
2005
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called it shortly after the war," suddenly appeared to be ahighly tangible concept.23
A. The Council of Europe at a Glance
Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe was the first
European organization established after World War 11.24 To-
day, this intergovernmental organization is comprised of
forty-six countries, including twenty-one from Central and
Eastern Europe that have acceded following the collapse of
the Iron Curtain.25 The Council of Europe's activities are
shaped by the commitment to the "three pillars," or the fun-
damental values on which the organization rests: pluralistic
democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. 6
Its goals include standardizing member countries' legal prac-
tices and promoting "awareness of a European identity based
thor).
22. Winston Churchill, Address in Zurich, Switzerland (Sept. 19, 1946), at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/AboutCoe/DiscoursChurchill.asp (last visited
Apr. 16, 2005). See also JASKIERNIA, supra note 16, at 18 ("'Our steadfast pur-
pose has to be the building and strengthening of the United Nations Organiza-
tion. As part of this world-wide structure and under its auspices we have to
recreate the European family-it could be the United States of Europe-and the
first practical step will be the Council of Europe.'" (quoting Winston Churchill)).
Churchill's address sought the reconciliation of former enemies such as France
and Germany through establishment of common European structures. See
Churchill, supra; see also JASKIERNIA, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting Winston
Churchill, Opening Address to the European Congress in The Hague, the Neth-
erlands on May 8-10, 1948, laying out the concept of a Council of Europe and
reiterating the notion of a united Europe).
23. See Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 313-14.
24. Id. at 313.
25. See Council of Europe, The Council of Europe's Member States, at
http://www.coe.int/T/e/com/about-coe/member-states/default.asp (last modified
Oct. 2004). Five other states (the Holy See (commonly known as Vatican City),
the United States, Canada, Japan, and Mexico) have observer status in the
Council of Europe. See COUNCIL OF EUR., THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: 800
MILLION EUROPEANS 7 (Council of Eur. Pub. Relations Div. ed., 2001). Ob-
server status may be granted to any state wishing to cooperate with the Council
of Europe and to observe the principles comprising the three pillars of the or-
ganization, namely pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights, and the
rule of law. These states may send observers to the organization and its com-
mittees, but may generally not be represented on the Committee of Ministers or
the Parliamentary Assembly. See COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS Res. 93 (26)
(1993), at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=619879&BackColorInternet=B9BDEE&Back
Colorlntranet=FFCD4F&BackColorLogged=FFC679 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
26. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 7.
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on shared values and cutting across different cultures."27
In carrying out these objectives, the Council's initiatives
include the conclusion of conventions and agreements28 aimed
at bringing national legal practices in conformity with one
another and with the principles29 espoused by the Council.3"
These multilateral agreements are legal instruments that are
binding on the states that ratify them and thus carry the
force of law.31 They are not statutory acts of the Council,
which is not explicitly entrusted with monitoring their im-
plementation; rather, it is the expression of the will of those
states that sign and ratify them that gives these instruments
legal significance-they attain a life of their own.32 Among
the most well-known achievements of the Council are the
passage of conventions on a wide variety of issues, including
human rights,33 rights of imprisoned persons, 34 rights of na-
27. Council of Europe, About the Council of Europe, at
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Coni/AboutCOE/ (last modified Jan. 2005).
28. For purposes of this comment, "treaty," "convention," and "agreement"
will be used interchangeably. For an explanation of the subtle difference be-
tween the latter two terms as used in the context of the Council of Europe, see
Council of Europe, About Conventions and Agreements, at
http://conventions.coe.intlgeneral/v31ntroConvENG.asp (last visited Apr. 16,
2005) (suggesting that conventions and agreements have in essence the same
legal effect, and the only difference is the form in which a state may express its
wish to be bound by one or the other).
29. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
30. See THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 41.
31. Id See also COUNCIL OF EUR., Monitoing of Compliance With Com-
mitments Entered Into by Council of Europe Member States: An Overview,
CE/OSCE(97)2, in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR
MONITORING COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
AND THE OSCE 9, 19 (1997) ("[T]hese [conventions] are governed by general
principles of international law and/or by specific provisions contained in the
treaties themselves.").
32. COUNCIL OF EUR., Monitoring of Compliance With Commitments En-
tered Into by Council of Europe Member States: An Overview, CE/OSCE(97)2,
in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING
COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE
9, 19 (1997). In the absence of specific provisions outlining monitoring of com-
pliance, "parties are responsible vis-&-vis one another for the reciprocal imple-
mentation of treaty obligations." Id.
33. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter ECHR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dig-
nity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medi-
cine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, Europ. T.S.
No. 164.
34. See European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126.
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tional minorities,35 lawful collection and use of personal
data,36 environmental protection,37 and social and economic
rights," to name a few.
The conventions are supplemented by numerous resolu-
tions and recommendations addressed to the member states,
which serve as "guidelines for national legislation or adminis-
trative practice" targeted at solving specific problems.39
Unlike the conventions, these resolutions and recommenda-
tions are not legally binding and do not carry the force of law
under general principles of international law.4° However, the
Council itself monitors compliance with them and may use its
internal mechanisms to ensure the states' compliance with
the resolutions and recommendations.4'
Membership in the Council of Europe entails numerous
obligations. These obligations are grounded in the Statute of
the Council of Europe,42 the European Convention on Human
Rights,43 other conventions to which the states are parties,
and in a series of "principles, rules, standards and values"
that have been elaborated on over the past fifty-plus years
within the Council of Europe with respect to the three fun-
damental pillars.45 Member states undertake the obligation
35. See Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157.
36. See Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Auto-
matic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108.
37. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of Environment Through Crimi-
nal Law, Nov. 4, 1998, Europ. T.S. No. 172.
38. See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35.
39. See THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 41.
40. See COUNCIL OF EUR., Council of Europe Monitoring Mechanisms: Gen-
era] Introduction, CE/OSCE(97)4, in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING
MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE 51, 52 (1997).
41. Possible sanctions for violating states include suspension of their mem-
bership and even expulsion from the Council. See Statute of the Council of
Europe, May 5, 1949, Europ. T.S. No. 1, ch. II, art. 8.
42. See id.
43. ECHR, supra note 33.
44. There are 198 international treaties sponsored by the Council of Europe.
See Council of Europe at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG
(last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
45. COUNCIL OF EUR., Monitoring of Compliance With Commitments En-
tered Into by Council of Europe Member States: An Overview, CE/OSCE(97)2,
in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING
COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE
9, 11(1997). The pillars are "democratic pluralism, human rights and the rule of
744 Vol: 45
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not only to formally accede to the Council's conventions
through signature and ratification, but to in fact bring their
legal systems in line with the set of standards promulgated in
those conventions, resolutions, and other instruments. 6
The Council of Europe must be distinguished from the
European Union ("EU"), which currently has twenty-five
members 7 and is scheduled to undergo further enlargement
in 2007.48 No country has ever joined the EU without first ob-
taining membership in the Council of Europe. 9 In that sense,
the Council of Europe has occasionally been referred to as the
"antechamber" leading to EU membership." Membership in
the EU includes numerous advantages that are particularly
enticing to Eastern European states, including economic
growth, political stability, and increased security.5
law." Id.
46. See id.
47. The most recent entrants in the EU are the ten countries that acceded
to the organization on May 1, 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland,
Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Malta. European Union,
The Member States, at http://www.eurunion.org/states/home.htm (last visited
May 15, 2005).
48. Two additional countries, Bulgaria and Romania, have completed their
entry negotiations and are scheduled to accede to the organization in 2007.
European Union, Enlargment, at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/agd2000/agd2000.htm. In addition, Turkey
and Croatia have commenced the negotiation process. European Union, The
Member States, at http://www.eurunion.org/states/home.htm (last visited May
15, 2005).
49. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 7. For a list of the current
twenty-five members of the European Union, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/indexen.html (last visited Aug. 13
2005).
50. Interview with Marin Raykov, Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria
to France, in Paris, France (Jan. 6, 2004) (on file with author). See also PETER
M. R. STIRK, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1914 at 260-61
(1996). For the Eastern European states in the post-Cold War environment, "en-
try into the Council of Europe ... proved comparatively easy." Id. at 245. Since
human rights play a seminal role in the Council's activities, the organization
was in position to act as a "gatekeeper" for integration with the West. Admis-
sion to the Council of Europe in turn was contingent on successful demonstra-
tion of the applicants' "democratic credentials." Id. at 260.
51. See, e.g., Europe's Magnetic Attraction: A Survey of European Enlarge-
ment, THE ECONOMIST, May 19, 2001, at 8. For a discussion of some of the
benefits and challenges of the process of European integration, see generally
Quo VADIS EUROPE? (Horst Siebert ed., Tubingen, Germany: Institut fur Welt-
wirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel, 1997).
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B. The Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council ofEurope
1. The Need for Monitoring
Following the collapse of the Iron Curtain and of the
communist empire in Eastern Europe, the Council underwent
a "spectacular enlargement,"52 doubling its membership from
twenty-three states in 1989 to forty-six as of this writing."
The fragility of the continent's post-communist democracies
has necessitated that the Council act as a "political anchor
and human rights watchdog" for these countries.' As a re-
sult, many of the organization's mechanisms are aimed at as-
sisting the former Soviet Bloc states in "carrying out and con-
solidating political, legal and constitutional reform in parallel
with economic reform."5 As it became apparent that it would
take a "considerable while" before these countries meet the
requirements for membership, a compromise was reached to
allow the Council to admit them yet maintain its credibility
as a champion of human rights and political freedoms.56 This
would be accomplished by extending a "credit of confidence"
whereby upon accession to the Council, candidate states for-
mally commit to adopt legislation and ratify Council-
sponsored instruments, and by, simultaneously, initiating a
monitoring procedure to ensure that these commitments are
implemented into the states' legal systems and are observed.57
The Council has established various mechanisms, whose goal
is to monitor whether member states, and particularly the
more recently acceded countries of Eastern Europe, meet the
52. Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 326.
53. Council of Europe, supra note 27.
54. Id.
55. Id. As one progress report prepared by the Council's institutions states,
Full compliance with the principles, standards, conventions and com-
mitments accepted by some of the states being monitored appears to be
a difficult goal to achieve in practice. It requires major reforms in the
states concerned: revision of the Constitution, new legislation, govern-
ment, administrative and judicial reforms, changes of habits and men-
talities, etc. In any event, it cannot be achieved without the assistance
and expertise, particularly in legal matters, of the Council of Europe.
Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL. DOC.
(9198) (2001).
56. Jan Kleijssen, The Monitoring Procedure of the Council of Europe's Par-
liamentary Assembly, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING
MECHANISMS 623, 624 (Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001).
57. Id. at 624-25.
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obligations that arise from membership in the organization."'
2. Monitoring Mechanisms
a. Legal Mechanisms for Monitoring
The Council of Europe's legal mechanisms for monitoring
stem from the multilateral international conventions and
agreements entered into by the member states: of these, the
most prominent instrument is the European Convention on
Human Rights ["ECHR"], which establishes a system of judi-
cial control.59 Enforcement of the ECHR is conducted by the
European Court of Human Rights on the basis of individuals'
and states' claims for violations in individual cases."° The ju-
dicial decisions are binding on the member states. 1 Ratifica-
tion of the ECHR is a compulsory condition for membership
in the Council of Europe, and as such is the most compelling
framework for legal monitoring."
In addition to the ECHR, numerous conventions estab-
lish mechanisms for legal enforcement of some of the funda-
mental principles espoused by the Council.' Ratification of
58. "Monitoring" in the context of human rights violations has been defined
as a:
[S]ustained (that is, repeated, at regular intervals), standardised (that
is, systematic) effort to gather data from a variety of sources on a set
occurrences involving human rights violations and/or warning indica-
tors pointing to the probable occurrence of such violations in many
cases and places (countries and territories) .... The monitoring should
in the end result in a capacity to make policy recommendations on the
basis of accurate early warning enabling prevention ....
Andrew Drzemczewski, Head, Secretary General's Monitoring Unit, Council of
Europe, International Colloquy, The Prevention of Human Rights Violations,
Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of Europe, Athens, Greece (May 24-25,
2004) (quoting A. P. SCHMID & A. J. JOGMAN, Introduction, in MONITORING
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 3 (A. P. Schmid & A. J. Jogman eds., 1992)).
59. COUNCIL OF EUR., Council of Europe Monitoring Mechanisms: General
Introduction, CE/OSCE(97)4, in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING
MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE 51, 52-53 (1997).
60. See id. at 53.
61. Id.
62. Id. "This scheme is compulsory because member States accept the politi-
cal obligation to ratify the Convention and to submit to the Convention's control
mechanism." Id.
63. These 195-plus instruments include the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126, the European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961,
Europ. T.S. No. 35, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
748 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 45
these treaties by the member states is optional; however, once
ratified, they are implemented into the respective state's local
body of law.'
b. Political Mechanisms for Monitoring: An Overlap
The multifaceted monitoring conducted by the Council of
Europe also includes political (i.e., lacking judicial oversight)
mechanisms that fall under the aegis of two of the organiza-
tion's three main bodies.6" The Council of Europe's Statute
6 6
institutes the intergovernmental organization's two primary
organs: the Committee of Ministers," or the decision-making
body, and the Parliamentary Assembly' ("Assembly"), or the
deliberative body. 9 Under the Statute, ensuring the fulfill-
ment of the parties' statutory obligations rests on both the
Committee of Ministers and the Assembly. ° In the event that
a country seriously violates its obligations, the Statute gives
the Committee of Ministers power to suspend or even termi-
Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157, and thirteen penal law conven-
tions. See supra note 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of fundamental
principles.
64. See THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 12.
65. See COUNCIL OF EUR., Council of Europe Monitoring Mechanisms: Gen-
eral Introduction, CE/OSCE(97)4, in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING
MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE 51, 53-55 (1997). This comment focuses on
the monitoring conducted by the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary
Assembly. In addition to that, the organization's third main organ, the Con-
gress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, also conducts monitoring
targeting the practice of local and regional autonomy in Europe. See id.
66. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 41.
67. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 8. The Committee of Minis-
ters comprises the Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the member states. "In col-
laboration with the Parliamentary Assembly, it is the guardian of the Council's
fundamental values, and monitors member states' compliance with their under-
takings." Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 15. The Parliamentary Assembly is composed of 301 representa-
tives (and the same number of substitutes) appointed by the forty-six member
states' national parliaments. The composition reflects the political forces within
the member states. Id.
69. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 41, at ch. III, art. 10.
70. See id. at ch. II, art. 3 ("Every Member of the Council of Europe must
accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collabo-
rate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council. .. ").
See also id. at arts. 4, 5 (providing that one of the preconditions of membership
in the international organization is the ability and willingness to fulfill the pro-
visions of Article 3).
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nate the concerned state's membership in the organization."
The Committee of Ministers' power to administer such sanc-
tions has been interpreted to also give rise to the power to
monitor the obligations of the member states as they are de-
rived from the Statute. 2
1. The Assembly's Monitoring Procedures
The Assembly's power to monitor is derived from the
Committee of Ministers' statutory obligation to consult with
the Assembly regarding decisions to grant, suspend, or ter-
minate membership status.73 The Assembly, in its turn, dele-
gates this power to the committees comprised of its individual
representatives. 74 Prior to 1997, there was no single commit-
tee entrusted exclusively with the duty of monitoring. 5 In-
stead, the Assembly's monitoring was administered by the
committee within whose substantive area of expertise a par-
ticular type of activity fell.7 ' For example, under this system,
alleged human rights violations by a particular member state
would be examined by the Legal Affairs and Human Rights
71. See id. at arts. 8, 9.
72. COUNCIL OF EuR., Monitoring of Compliance with Commitments En-
tered into by Council of Europe Member States: An Overview, CE/OSCE(97)2, in
METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR MONITORING
COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE OSCE
9, 12 (1997).
73. See Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 41, at ch. V, art. 23.
See also COMM. OF MIN. STAT. RES. (51) 30 (providing for the opinion of the As-
sembly being sought and obtained with regard to such actions).
74. EUR. PARL. ASS., Res. No. 1202 (1999). Prior to 1997, these committees
were: Political Affairs; Legal Affairs and Human Rights; Economic Affairs and
Development; Social, Health and Family Affairs; Migration, Refugees and Popu-
lation; Culture, Science and Education; Environment, Agriculture and Local
and Regional Affairs; Equal Opportunities for Women and Men; Rules of Proce-
dure and Immunities; and, Monitoring. See THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra
note 25, at 16.
75. See COUNCIL OF EUR., Note Prepared by the Office of the Clerk of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Parliamentary Assem-
bly's Mechanism for the Monitoring of Compliance With Obligations and Com-
mitments, in METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR
MONITORING COMMITMENTS BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
AND THE OSCE 91,95 (1997).
76. See EUR. PARL. ASS. ORDER (488) (June 29, 1993) (instructing the Politi-
cal Affairs Committee and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
to "monitor closely the honoring of commitments" of new member states). See
also EUR. PARL. ASS. ORDER (508) (Apr. 26, 1995) (instituting in greater detail
the monitoring scope and procedure).
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Committee.77
Both the increased scale and the long-term nature of
monitoring in the wake of the post-communist states' acces-
sion necessitated the creation of a more established monitor-
ing mechanism.78 Thus, a permanent committee entrusted
exclusively with the responsibility for conducting monitoring
was created 9  In April 1997, the Assembly established the
Committee on the Honouring0 of Obligations and Commit-
ments by Member States of the Council of Europe, commonly
referred to as the "Monitoring Committee" ("Committee").8'
In Resolution 1115, the Assembly delegated to this Commit-
tee the duty of administering monitoring. 2 The Committee's
composition reflects a desire to achieve political and regional
balance in the representation: the eighty-three members are
nominated by the political groups of the Assembly, with geo-
graphical factors being taken into account.83 Resolution 1115
also sets forth the conditions for initiation of a monitoring
procedure on a member state.84 Finally, it establishes the
77. See Interview with Maria Spassova, Member of Bulgarian Parliament
and representative of Bulgaria at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, in Sofia, Bulgaria (Dec. 17, 2003) (transcript on file with author). Mrs.
Spassova has been a member of the Council of Europe's Monitoring Committee
from its inception in 1997, as well as a member of the Bulgarian Parliament's
Foreign Policy Committee and Committee on European Integration.
78. Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), COUNCIL OF EUR.,
Doc. AS/Mon/Inf (2002)03.
79. Id.
80. The Council of Europe has adopted British English spelling. This com-
ment preserves the original spelling of words when used in names of entities
and in direct quotations as they appear in the Council's official documents.
Therefore, where applicable, this comment uses British English spelling, and
not American English spelling.
81. See EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1115) (Jan. 29, 1997).
82. Resolution 1115 promulgated the purpose of the Committee as
responsible for verifying the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by
the member states under the terms of the Council of Europe Statute,
the European Convention on Human Rights and all other Council of
Europe conventions to which they are parties, as well as the honouring
of the commitments entered into by the authorities of member states
upon their accession to the Council of Europe.
Id. Resolution 1115 initially established the Committee to consist of sixty-five
members. Id. Subsequently, in 2005, the number of seats was increased to
eighty-three. Progress of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
ASS. DOC. (10541) (2005).
83. Id.
84. See id. Resolution 1115 calls for two co-rapporteurs to be appointed for
each state for which a monitoring procedure is initiated. The mechanism of se-
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formal consequences of a state's persistent failure to honor
the obligations and commitments its membership entails.85
Naturally, there are also other, less tangible ramifications of
such a failure, such as, for example, the stigma associated
with a state's noncompliance.86
There are numerous substantive areas covered under the
monitoring procedure.87 In the realm of pluralist democracy,
the Committee monitors: separation of powers; elections;" po-
litical parties;89 parliament;9" special powers in emergency
situations; 91 and local and regional self-government. 92 Simi-
larly, in the areas of rule of law and human rights, monitor-
ing is conducted on: the status of domestic law vis-A-vis inter-
national human rights treaties; effectiveness of constitutional
and/or legal guarantees for human rights; judicial system;93
police attitudes; prison conditions and administration; respect
for private and family life;94 property rights;95 freedom of wor-
ship and conscience; freedom of expression, notably of the
media; freedom of association; freedom of movement and as-
sembly; equality between men and women; minorities;96 poli-
cies to combat racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia." Fi-
nally, the Committee monitors the settlement of internal and
international disputes by peaceful means.98
lection of these co-rapporteurs (one from each main party, various geographic
regions represented) is aimed at ensuring political and regional balance. Id.
85. See id. The sanctions include non-ratification or annulment of creden-
tials. See also Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 41, at ch. II, arts. 8,
9 (providing for suspension or termination of membership).
86. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
87. See THE MONITORING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY app. 2 (1999).
88. See id (including electoral law, access to media, assessment of whether
free, general, secret and fair).
89. See id. (including status, conditions for setting up, fiscal rules, and party
finances).
90. See id. (including pluralist composition, minority representation, control
over the executive, immunities, rights and duties of the opposition).
91. Id. (referring to use and control).
92. Id.
93. THE MONITORING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY supra note 87 (including independence of the judiciary, access to jus-
tice, criminal justice, role and status of public prosecutors, status of attorneys).
94. See id. (emphasizing data protection).
95. Id. (including restitution and fair compensation).
96. Id. (including non-discrimination, citizenship legislation, status and
education in minority languages).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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2. The Committee of Ministers' Monitoring
Procedures
The Committee of Ministers performs its own quasi-
judicial monitoring activity, distinct from that of the Assem-
bly's Monitoring Committee.99 The Committee of Ministers'
monitoring is referred to as "thematic monitoring."100 It is
conducted in ten areas, or "themes," namely: freedom of ex-
pression and information, functioning and protection of de-
mocratic institutions, functioning of the judicial system, local
democracy, capital punishment, police and security forces, ef-
fectiveness of judicial remedies, non-discrimination, freedom
of conscience and religion, and gender equality. 1' The Com-
mittee of Ministers has justified this extensive proliferation of
monitoring activity conducted by both organs as having been
made imperative by the Council of Europe's enlargement and
inclusion of the new Eastern European democracies." 2
3. Post-1990 Proliferation of Monitoring:
Monitoring Procedures and Post-Monitoring
Dialogues
Currently, the Committee monitors ten countries.' 3 In
addition, there are five countries'" with which the Council of
Europe is engaged in a so-called "post-monitoring dialogue"-
a less stringent form of monitoring. 5 The philosophy behind
99. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
100. COUNCIL OF EUR. MONITORING DEPARTMENT OF THE DIRECTORATE OF
STRATEGIC PLANNING, Compliance With Member States' Commitments: The
Committee of Ministers'Monitoring Procedures, Doc. Monitor/Inf (2003)4, (Sept.
29, 2003).
101. Seeid
102. See Reply From the Comm. of Ministers to Recommendation 1536, Doc.
9312 (2002) (stating that "[allong with the enlargement of the Organisation,
there appeared to be an increased need for monitoring by both the Assembly
and the Committee of Ministers").
103. As of April 18, 2005, these ten states are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Monaco, Russia, Serbia and Monte-
negro, and Ukraine. Progress of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR.
PARL. ASS. Doc. (10541) app. B (2005).
104. These five states are: Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Turkey, and the For-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. See id.
105. Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), COUNCIL OF EUR.,
Doc. AS/Mon/lnf (2002)03 (describing this post-monitoring mechanism as ena-
bling the Committee to "maintain a constructive dialogue with the member
states in respect of which the monitoring procedure has been concluded but
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the post-monitoring mechanism is similar to that of the moni-
toring procedure in that it seeks to ensure the affected state's
compliance."' It differs, however, in that it "no longer reflects
a 'guardianship' role, but responds to a request for assis-
tance."1°' Also, unlike the official monitoring procedure,
which was promulgated through Resolution 1115 at the time
of the Committee's inception, the procedure and methodology
for conducting post-monitoring dialogue was not formally in-
tegrated into the Assembly Rules of Procedure until 2005.18
There are numerous examples that illustrate the types of
noncompliance with the Council's standards occurring in the
fragile Eastern European democracies that have triggered the
proliferation of monitoring procedures.' While the specifics
of Eastern states' noncompliance are not the focus of this
comment, it is useful to take one of these nations, Bulgaria,
as a representative example to demonstrate the issues in-
volved."'
C. An Example of One Eastern European State's
Noncompliance: The Case of Bulgaria
Bulgaria, which acceded to the Council in 1992,"' was
which, while on the right track, have not yet reached the stage where they fully
honour all their obligations and commitments.").
106. Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
Ass. Doc. (9651) (2003).
107. Id.
108. Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
ASS. DOC. (10250) (2004); EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. (1431) (Mar. 18, 2005) (promul-
gating provisions for conducting post-monitoring dialogue). See also Initiation
of a monitoring procedure and post-monitoring dialogue, EUR. PARL. Ass. Doc.
(10475) (2005).
109. See id. See also Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Proce-
dure, EUR. PARL. Ass. Doc. (9198) (2001). See, e.g., the commitments referred
to in EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. (1123) (Apr. 24, 1997) and EUR. PARL. ASS. REC.
(1326) (Apr. 24, 1997) for Romania; EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. (1211) (Jan. 26, 2000)
and EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1442) (Jan. 26, 2000) for Bulgaria; EUR. PARL. Ass.
RES. (1196) (Sept. 21, 1999) and EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1419) (Sept. 21, 1999) for
Slovakia; EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1185) (Apr. 29, 1999), EUR. PARL. ASs. REC.
(1405) (Oct. 7, 1999), EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1223) (Sept. 26, 2000) and EUR.
PARL. ASS. REC. (1973) (2000) for Croatia; EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. (1236) (Jan. 23,
2001) and EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1490) (Jan. -23, 2001) for Latvia; EUR. PARL.
ASS. RES. (1338) (Sept. 22, 1997) for the Czech Republic; EUR. PARL. ASS. RES.
(1213) (Apr. 5, 2000) and EUR. PARL. Ass. REC. (1453) (Apr. 25, 2000) for the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
110. A detailed examination of the situation of each Eastern European state
would be too cumbersome for the purposes of this comment.
111. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 7.
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monitored closely for its divergence from Council standards in
a number of areas as identified below."2 The Assembly initi-
ated formal monitoring of Bulgaria's commitments in 1994."'
In assessing the extent of compliance of the country with its
obligations, the Monitoring Committee's co-rapporteurs1 14 for
Bulgaria in 1998 identified the following major areas of con-
cern: (1) inadequacy of legislative and judicial reforms; (2) ab-
sence of legislation safeguarding the independence of the me-
dia from interference and censorship by the government; (3)
police violence against members of religious communities; (4)
problems with the independence of the judiciary in theory and
in practice; (5) political purges; and (6) legislation related to
election and appointment of local self-government."' In 1999,
monitoring of Bulgaria was conducted in the areas of: local
and regional self-government, judicial system, police atti-
tudes, prison conditions and administration, respect for pri-
vate and family life, freedom of worship and conscience, free-
dom of expression, and minorities."6
By 2000, Bulgaria was deemed to have made sufficient
progress to justify termination of the formal monitoring pro-
cedure However, there still remained an array of issues that
continued to present concern to the Council, namely: the
training of judges, magistrates, police officers and prison
staff; the fight against corruption; minority rights;"7 and the
112. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
113. See EUR. PARL. ASS. ORDER (488) (June 29, 1993); EUR. PARL. ASS.
ORDER (508) (Apr. 26, 1995). After the Assembly set up the Monitoring Com-
mittee in 1997, the latter took over all existing monitoring procedures. See dis-
cussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
114. An official monitoring procedure with respect to a given country entails
the appointment of two members of the Monitoring Committee as co-
rapporteurs in assessing that country's honoring its obligations. See EUR. PARL.
ASS. RES. (1115) (Jan. 29, 1997).
115. See Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR.
PARL. Ass. Doc. (8180) (1998).
116. See THE MONITORING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY, supra note 87.
117. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77 (referring to the not
yet publicly released document entitled Comments of the UdDF-DSB Parlia-
mentary group on the Memorandum of the Chairman of the Monitoring Com-
mission at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concerning the
post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria). Among the examples of minority
rights violations are the placement of Roma children of mainstream mental
ability in special schools for children with mental disabilities and two-track
adoption systems. See id.
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implementation of the European Social Charter"8 and the
European Charter of Local Self-Government" 9 into the local
body of law.Y° While the monitoring procedure with respect
to Bulgaria was officially closed, these remaining issues of
concern led the Council to adopt a new practice: the so-called
post-monitoring dialogue. 2'
The precedent for this practice was set in dealing with
the case of Bulgaria, but it has subsequently been applied to
five other states upon their release from official monitoring."'
In a sense, this mechanism acts as a probation period, where
the country is subject to less stringent monitoring, but where
a reopening of the official monitoring procedures could take
place if a relapse in the offending behavior occurs.'23 A state
that satisfactorily complies with the conditions identified by
the Council in the post-monitoring dialogue is then released
from this mechanism as well."
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Eastern European states often fall short of meeting the
legal obligations they have undertaken as part of their acces-
118. European Social Charter, supra note 38. While the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights focuses on guaranteeing civil and political human rights,
the European Social Charter guarantees social and economic human rights.
http://www.coe.int/T/E/HumanRights/Esc/1_GeneralPresentation (last visited
May 15, 2005).
119. European Charter of Local Self-Government, Oct. 15, 1985, Europ. T.S.
No. 122 (establishing principles of local self-government for the signatory na-
tions).
120. See EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1442) (Jan. 26, 2000). In addition, a new
item of concern sprang from the passage of a new Bulgarian law on religion, the
so-called "Confessions Act 2002." The concerns stem from the statute's ambigu-
ous drafting and the slightly preferential treatment it affords to the country's
predominant religion, Eastern Orthodox Christianity. See EUR. PARL. ASS. RES.
(1390) (Sept. 7, 2004).
121. Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
ASs. Doc. (9651) (2003).
122. Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
123. See EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1211) (Jan. 26, 2000). The Assembly under-
takes to
pursue its dialogue with the Bulgarian authorities on the issues re-
ferred to [earlier], or any other issues arising from the obligations of
Bulgaria as a member state of the Council of Europe, with a view to re-
opening procedure in accordance with Resolution 1115 . . . if further
clarification or enhanced co-operation should seem desirable. Id.
124. So far, Croatia has been the first country to be taken off the post-
monitoring dialogue procedure. See Progress of the Assembly's Monitoring Pro-
cedure, EUR. PARL. ASS. DOC. (10541) app. B (2005).
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sion to the Council of Europe.125 Some of these countries have
failed to sign and/or ratify various conventions facilitated by
the Council. 26 Others have done so, but only in form, while in
practice they have taken few steps towards implementing
them into their domestic legal systems.2 7 Such noncompli-
ance impacts the functioning not only of the Council of
Europe, but also of the European legal system to the extent
that the latter is grounded in norms and instruments derived
from the Council's legal and political framework.
It has been widely recognized that the newer member
states of the Council of Europe have experienced substantial
difficulties in complying with the guidelines and principles
derived from their membership in the organization."8 This
phenomenon is partially attributable to a wide variety of in-
ternal issues specific to the individual countries involved,
many of which are attributable to the myriad of challenges
and obstacles that accompany the transitional period from
communism to democracy. These often include the slow pace
of the political, legislative, judicial, economic, and social re-
forms due to the ossified structures and attitudes inherited
from the totalitarian era.1 2 9
For example, matters of fundamental importance to the
Council of Europe, such as the protection of human rights and
the environment, in communist regimes were treated as "the
least important items on the ruling elite's agenda."3 ° The
process of changing such attitudes can be difficult and time-
consuming. Moreover, while these nations' Western Euro-
pean counterparts had many decades to develop and imple-
ment democratic norms and structures, Eastern European
countries are expected to do so almost overnight following the
125. See discussion, supra Part II.B.2.b.3.
126. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77. For a complete list-
ing, see the list of conventions sponsored by the Council of Europe at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2005).
127. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
128. See Honouring of commitments entered into by new member states,
EUR. PARL. ASS. Doc. (7037) (1994).
129. Id.
130. Interview with Luchezar Toshev, Member of Bulgarian Parliament, in
Sofia, Bulgaria (Dec. 18, 2003) (on file with author). Mr. Toshev is also chair-
man of the Human Rights and Religion Committee and member of the Foreign
Policy Committee of the Bulgarian Parliament, as well as representative of Bul-
garia at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
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collapse of their communist dictatorship governments.'
While the aforementioned internal problems help explain
the Eastern European states' noncompliance with the norms
and regulations discussed, the focus of this analysis is not on
them. Instead, this comment examines the inherent charac-
teristics of the Council of Europe's monitoring process itself
and advances the notion that they too play a role in the prob-
lem of noncompliance.
A combination of factors inherent in the Council of
Europe's own procedures and mechanisms exerts an influence
on the Eastern European members' difficulties with meeting
their commitments and obligations. First, there was a lack of
true participation by the Eastern European countries in the
creation of the rules that they are obliged to follow: a problem
that, unfortunately, cannot be remedied without turning back
the clock on history. Second, the Council of Europe has been
sending mixed messages to the Eastern European states
through structural overlap in its procedures and application
of double standards to Western as opposed to Eastern Euro-
pean member states. This latter set of factors, which are
more amenable to changes, is where the focus of attention
should be turned.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Lack ofMeaningful Participation by Eastern European
States in the Establishment of the Council of Europe's
Principles and Norms
Ancient Roman wisdom says that a law which is not ob-
served is a bad law."2 It is also a widely accepted truth that
coming to respect, embrace, and abide by what one perceives
as the imposition of a foreign will can be quite challenging.
133
In order to comply with a system of rules, one has to partici-
pate in its creation, or at least have a true, meaningful oppor-
131. Per the author's personal experience and observations as a native of one
such Eastern European country, Bulgaria.
132. Id.; see also MARGUERITE YOURCENAR, MEMOIRS OF HADRIAN 115-16
(Farrar, Straus & Company 1951) (1954) ("If too severe, [laws] are broken, and
with good reason. If too complicated, human ingenuity finds means to slip eas-
ily between the meshes of this trailing but fragile net .... Any law too often
subject to infraction is bad . . ").
133. See Interview with Marin Raykov, supra note 50.
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tunity to do so."" Else, the rule feels like a virus, which the
entity's immune system is innately programmed to fight
against.'35 This applies with equal force to both a sovereign
nation and a human being.
The Eastern European states, which did not participate
in the drafting and creation of the Council of Europe's rules,
feel that the latter are imposed on them. The vast majority of
the principles and norms on which the Council of Europe's
treaties rest were synthesized during the course of the Cold
War, when only the states of Western Europe were members
of the Council.3 6 Therefore, only those states had the oppor-
tunity to constructively participate in the creation of the prin-
ciples and norms. The Eastern European countries, by con-
trast, were not handed the finished product until decades
later, following the collapse of the Iron Curtain. 137  Treaties
and conventions were presented to them on a "take-it-or-
leave-it" basis. 8' It is only natural that they would be in-
clined to reject that which has been imposed on them.
Critics of this argument have pointed out that since
membership in the Council of Europe is voluntary, it is up to
each state to decide whether it wishes to accede to the organi-
zation and become a party to the set of treaties and conven-
134. See id.
[T]he future of democracy in Europe lies less in fortifying and perpetu-
ating existing formal institutions and informal practices than in adapt-
ing them to a changing context.
Like the Queen of Hearts in the famous novel "Alice in Wonder-
land", democracy needs to run faster than the world around it in order
to remain in place. By keeping the spirit of democracy alive, we create
the fundamental conditions for peace, stability and prosperity for 800
million Europeans.
Deputy Secretary General Maud De Boer-Buquicchio, Speech at the Conference
on "The Future of Democracy in Europe," in Barcelona, Spain (Nov. 17, 2004),
available at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/integrated-projects/democracy/O2_Activities/16_Finalcon
ference/Deputy/20Secretary%20General.asp (last visited May 15, 2005).
135. See id.
136. See Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 326. He suggests that the Council
is increasingly assuming the pan-European dimension that was origi-
nally intended for it, but for forty years prevented by Europe's post-
World War II ideological division; it now has the chance to promote its
basic values and principles in the "other Europe" which, until recently,
had been deprived of their enjoyment.
137. See id.
138. Interview with Luchezar Toshev, supra note 131.
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tions sponsored by it.' 39 This manner of analyzing the situa-
tion, however, is an oversimplified one because membership
in the Council of Europe has been largely perceived as a req-
uisite passage on the way to entering the European Union. '
It is virtually unthinkable for a country to turn down the op-
portunity to become a member of the Council. Doing so would
have substantially negative ramifications, including ostra-
cism by the community of remaining European states, and,
more importantly, cutting off of economic and infrastructural
aid-a highly valued commodity for Eastern European states
that have found themselves engulfed in the turbulent waters
of post-communism."' For that reason, those countries' gov-
ernments "have no choice but to bow [their] heads and sign
everything [they] are handed, no questions asked."''
This absence of bargaining power leads the Eastern
European states into signing the European conventions, ea-
ger to find approval in the face of their more prominent West-
ern counterparts, resulting in the building of a "facade or Po-
temkin village of democracy" rather than a "genuinely
democratic regime and society."'' At the same time, however,
although they were quick to commit themselves and seem-
ingly embrace the rules promulgated by the West, the East-
ern countries nevertheless fail to deliver on their promises: in
that sense, they are untruthful in their declamations to the
West.'"
The frequent turnover of governments in formerly com-
munist states and the lack of continuity in the platforms of
succeeding administrations also play a role. 14  There is the
real concern that commitments undertaken by one political
party in power at a given moment may be retracted as soon as
139. See Interview with Caroline Ravaud, Head of the Secretariat in the
Committee on the Honouring of the Obligations and Commitments by Member
States. Council of Europe, in Paris, France (Jan. 5, 2004) (on file with author).
140. See supra Part II.A. See also Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 332 (Mem-
bership in the Council is regarded as a "key that opens other doors, particularly
those of the European Union.").
141. Per author's personal experience and observations as a native of Bul-
garia.
142. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
143. Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 332.
144. See id. (suggesting that "some of the leaders of the countries involved do
not appear really willing to push through the necessary reforms and to honor
their commitments").
145. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
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another party seizes power. 146  A future administration can
therefore easily adopt a contrary position. This gives rise to a
monumental double betrayal: on the one hand, the Eastern
government has misrepresented its intentions to its Western
partners in Strasbourg 7 and Brussels,' 8 and there is no real,
firm commitment to the norms that are seemingly adopted;
149
on the other hand, the populace itself is being betrayed by its
elected representatives.
150
The necessity for a more meaningful representation of
the Eastern European states is also supported by the Assem-
bly's finding that the Monitoring Committee, while based on
nominations by political groups and thus reflecting a political
balance, comes short of representing a regional balance. 5'
The Assembly has recommended that this principle be taken
into account to assure a more fair representation, in particu-
lar of the states under scrutiny."2
Another negative ramification of the nonparticipation of
Eastern countries in the creation of the rules is that they per-
ceive the monitoring mechanism as a punitive procedure be-
cause the states being monitored do not fully understand the
reasons that stand behind it.'5' They have not participated in
the making of the rules and therefore do not comprehend the
objectives." The lack of a defined purpose results in a vac-
uum being created, and there is a real danger that the inter-
nal balance of the system will be undermined.'55
146. See id.
147. Location of the Council of Europe's headquarters.
148. Location of the European Union's headquarters.
149. See Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 331-32. See also Interview with Marin
Raykov, supra note 50; Interview with Caroline Ravaud, supra note 140.
150. Interview with Marin Raykov, supra note 50.
151. See EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1260) (Sept. 26, 2001).
152. Id.
153. See Interview with Marin Raykov, supra note 50.
154. Id.
155. Id. For a discussion of the similar challenges aspiring EU members face
in distinguishing between "national interest" and a "pan-European interest,"
see also Krassimir Nikolov, Meeting Integration Challenges "Tm Krebsgang:
From Implementing EUPolicies Towards Making Them, at
http://www.becsa.org/start-en.php?id=enPolicy-Making (last visited Apr. 30,
2005).
If a state's motivation for joining the EU is based on the perception that such
membership presents a confrontation between national and non-national inter-
ests, it is in essence
coming into the club in order to protect what is "ours", to say "no" to
anyone that wants to deprive us from what is "ours", and, if possible, to
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The equilibrium among the nations is crucial, and its dis-
ruption would lead to "disintegration of the system."156 The
latter may happen when the members do not see their func-
tions and duties as having equal weight.'57 France and Ger-
many, for example, being among the more powerful states in
the continent, frequently dictate the outcome of various situa-
tions that arise.' This situation is representative of a "poly-
structural system where only a few of the [states] dictate the
rules,""' 9 and therefore the result is a "Europe based on their
norms and criteria." This leads to a double standard.
Moreover, rules that are neither constructed nor enforced
with everyone's participation are naturally perceived as pun-
ishment by the more disadvantaged parties.
The Assembly has expressed the opinion that, if its new
members are expected to embrace European democratic stan-
dards, they must be better acquainted with the existence and
nature of these standards.' The organization's statement
that "[o]nly better informed citizens could be genuine partici-
pants in the democratic debate," 6' however, appears some-
what hypocritical. Critics have pointed out that this type of
statement is a disguise for the Western countries' holding
their value systems out as supreme." As a result, Eastern
take a bigger slice of what is someone else's. If we apply such logic, lit-
tle time will pass before we become isolated inside the club, and all
ambitions to participate in joint policy making together with the other
partners will prove a mirage .... If we ask ourselves the question
"What do we want to GET from the EU?", we shall achieve little. We
should rather have clarity over "what we want to DO together in the
EU?".
Id.
156. Interview with Matin Raykov, supra note 50.
157. Id.
158. Per the author's personal observations as a European native.
159. Interview with Matin Raykov, supra note 50.
160. Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
161. See EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1536) (Sept. 26, 2001).
162. Id.
163. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
"I shall accept you as an equal, but only if you are actually identical to
me." This is racism. In order to create one Europe, it has to be based
on an exchange of values, and there can be no such exchange where one
side dictates the rules. Saying "forget your values, from today on only
ours are valid" is a de facto occupation .... In a sense, all are made to
bow before the gods, but only some are invited inside the shrine ....
This has another problematic ramification: because the "second-class"
worshippers come to this shrine not as equals, they have a strong moti-
vation to vandalize it. They do not contribute anything; they take bar-
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countries do not fully embrace these values, but merely ap-
pear to strive to uphold them, in order to glean economic and
other benefits."M This is directly linked to the problem of non-
compliance with the norms.'65
In addition to its chilling effect on compliance, the non-
participation of Eastern states in the creation of the norms
contains an additional peril: the absence of responsibility by
the Council of Europe in the event the behavior that has been
encouraged in a particular Eastern European state actually
leads to unforeseen adverse consequences.'66 The monitoring
criteria, having been elaborated without the participation of
the Eastern members, carry the potential of inadequacy for
addressing situations based on circumstances very different
from those found in the West.6 7 The question Eastern states
would logically find themselves asking is: who will assume
the responsibility if things take the wrong turn?6. When an
authority bids a state to act in a certain way, it must bear the
responsibility for the ramifications: "When the foundations of
a law are laid, the material basis for its application is created,
which implies that someone must take responsibility for the
consequences of its implementation."' In light of their
unique historical and political contexts, Eastern states need
more assistance in the implementation of the laws and assur-
ance that there will be a safety net in case their progress
takes an unexpected turn for the worse.
B. The Mixed Messages the Council of Europe Sends to
Eastern Countries through Duplication ofits Monitoring
Procedures and Use of Double Standards
The monitoring mechanisms themselves may also lead to
noncompliance. 7 ' The Assembly considers the reports arising
from its monitoring procedure "an invaluable source of refer-
barically. When the principle of distribution is unfair, then all try to
grab as much as they can. In these circumstances, the equilibrium is
lost.
Id.
164. See Leuprecht, supra note 17, at 332.
165. See Interview with Marin Raykov, supra note 50.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See supra Part II.B.
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ence for the European Union in dealing with the EU member-
ship applications of the countries concerned."'' However, the
Assembly simultaneously has conceded the need for reexami-
nation of the Council of Europe's purpose by stating, "certain
principles laid down in Resolution 1115 (1997)172... need at
present to be restated.'
73
1. Duplication of Monitoring Mechanisms
One part of the problem with monitoring may be traced
to overlap in the functions of the Committee of Ministers and
the Assembly.17 The Assembly has admitted that, in its view,
monitoring procedures "have expanded rapidly" within the
Council of Europe's framework, which poses a "threat to the
visibility, and thus the effectiveness of the work of the As-
sembly in the field of monitoring.' 75 At issue is the conflict
between, on the one hand, the ad hoc monitoring of democ-
ratic developments in certain countries, as administered by
the Committee of Ministers, and, on the other hand, the As-
sembly's monitoring procedure as administered by its Moni-
toring Committee.
76
The Monitoring Committee, in its progress reports to the
Assembly, has repeatedly cautioned about the inherent risks
of the simultaneous operation of the two mechanisms. 77 In
its 2001 report, the Committee denounced the duplication of
the two mechanisms, which creates a risk of diverging as-
sessments of whether states have honored their obligations. 78
The overlap also poses the risk of creating confusion among
the monitored states as to what criteria they must comply
with.179 In a progress report to the Assembly in 2003, the
Monitoring Committee reiterated its warning that the exis-
tence of duplicate or competing monitoring procedures carries
171. EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1260) (Sept. 26, 2001).
172. EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1115) (Jan. 29, 1997) (concerning the establish-
ment of the Monitoring Committee).
173. EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1260) (Sept. 26, 2001).
174. See supra Part II.B.
175. EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. (1260) (Sept. 26, 2001).
176. Id.
177. See Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR.
PARL. ASS. DOC. (9198) (2001); Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring
Procedure, EUR. PARL. ASS. DOC. (9651) (2003).
178. Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
Ass. Doc. (9198) (2001).
179. Id.
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the risk of confusion and serves neither the credibility nor the
visibility of the organization. 80
While the Assembly has unambiguously endorsed these
conclusions of its Monitoring Committee, 8 the Committee of
Ministers' response has been less clear. The latter has at-
tempted to justify the monitoring it conducts with the argu-
ment that the Council of Europe's enlargement has resulted
in an "increased need for monitoring" by both organs of the
organization.'82 This response of the Committee of Ministers
has been perceived by Assembly representatives as evasive
and "skirting the issue.""3
Not only has the Monitoring Committee admitted to the
problem presented by this duplication, but, in fact, govern-
ment officials from the Eastern European countries directly
affected by the mechanism have noted the confusion to which
this procedure subjects them."M One member of the Bulgar-
ian Parliament, who is also a Bulgarian delegate on the
Council of Europe's Monitoring Committee, has, by virtue of
this unique position, witnessed the problem from both sides:
As a nation under monitoring, Bulgaria has received
mixed signals from the Council with regard to the exact
criteria it is expected to follow. When rapporteurs come
from the Monitoring Committee, they make a number of
observations as to what our alleged violations are. Then,
when the Committee of Ministers sends an ad hoc delega-
tion as part of its thematic monitoring activities, they
would have a whole set of different criticisms. It confuses
the Bulgarian policymakers tremendously.
85
The representative also noted the difficulties the situa-
tion presents to the monitors as well:
When [the Monitoring Committee]'s rapporteurs prepare
one set of observations on the state of violations in, say,
Armenia, and then [the Committee of Ministers' observ-
180. Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
Ass. Doc. (9651) (2003).
181. See EUR. PARL. Ass. RES. (1260) (Sept. 26, 2001), followed subsequently
by EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. 1536 (Sept. 26, 2001).
182. See Reply From the Comm. of Ministers to Recommendation 1536, Doc.
9312 (2002)
183. Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
184. See id. (stating that many Eastern European delegates who represent
their nations at the Assembly have frequently expressed concern about the
structural overlap).
185. Id.
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ers] return with a different account of the situation, there
is ambiguity as to whether Armenia in fact is complying
with its obligations or not.
186
The structural overlap in the monitoring mechanism
serves neither those who perform the monitoring nor those
being monitored.
187
Another type of duplicate monitoring mechanisms result-
ing in confusion occurs in the context of post-monitoring. The
case of Latvia is illustrative. Latvia was undergoing post-
monitoring dialogue with the Council, when in 2002 the
Monitoring Committee, upon members' motion, suddenly
faced the question of possibly reopening the official monitor-
ing procedure on that country.' A lengthy discussion ensued
within the Assembly (between the Monitoring Committee and
the Bureau), finally resulting in a 2004 decision not to reopen
the official monitoring procedure. 9 This example of the
Monitoring Committee's examination of the request to reopen
a monitoring procedure while post-monitoring dialogue was in
progress resembles "a real dialogue of the deaf' between the
Assembly's organs, threatening "lasting damage to the exer-
cise of post-monitoring procedure."9 °
2. The Application ofDouble Standards
Another piece of the Council's mixed message to the
countries of Eastern Europe lies in the application of double
standards in its treatment of its older, more prominent West-
ern members, in comparison to that of its newer ones from
the East. "The fact that an Eastern country witnesses its
supposedly equal peers from the West being held to a differ-
ent, somewhat laxer, standard of compliance does not serve to
promote its own compliance.""'
The double standard treatment is apparent in how a pro-
cedure is initiated or reinstated.'92 The progress reports of
the Monitoring Committee repeatedly point to the problem of
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL.
Ass. Doc. (10250) (2004).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
192. See Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR.
PARL. ASS. DOC. (9651) (2003).
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the vagueness of the criteria based on which it is determined
whether to initiate or reinstate a monitoring procedure.'93 In
response, the Assembly has authorized the Committee to de-
fine these criteria more clearly.' The absence of such clearly
defined criteria results in no assurances against the applica-
tion of double standards, where violations by older and more
prominent members are overlooked, while those committed by
newer members are taken into account.
195
The problem of this mixed message is so acute that even
Western states' representatives at the Council have been
forced to admit it. According to an Assembly delegate from
the United Kingdom, 9" the constitutional controversy sur-
rounding Liechtenstein is an example of this threat."'
Upon being alerted to the development in Liechten-
stein,9 ' the Monitoring Committee recommended to the As-
sembly that a monitoring procedure be initiated. 99 However,
the Assembly ultimately rejected the proposal to open such a
monitoring procedure on one of its older members, namely
Liechtenstein, possibly with the consideration that the moni-
toring is intended to apply only to new democracies. °° This
appeared to be an unconvincing argument, for if the purpose
of the monitoring procedure is to ensure that member states
honor their commitments to the organization, then which
party is in violation is irrelevant. 01
193. See, e.g., id.
194. See EUR. PARL. ASS. ORDER (585) (2003).
195. Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
196. Interview with Lord Kilclooney, Representative of the United Kingdom
at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in Paris, France (Jan.
9, 2004) (on file with author).
197. Id. Liechtenstein, which is among the older members of the Council,
having acceded to the organization in 1978, has been undergoing a revision of
its constitutional structure, which in essence would change the country from a
constitutional monarchy to a near-absolute monarchy by granting a vast in-
crease in the power of the Prince. Such a system is in contradiction with the
fundamental principles on which the Council rests. Id.
198. In May 2002, the Monitoring Committee received two memoranda from
citizens of Liechtenstein concerning the current revision of their country's Con-
stitution. See Progress Report of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR.
PARL. ASs. Doc. (9651) (2003); Progress of the Assembly's Monitoring Proce-
dure, EuR. PARL. ASs. Doc. (10250) (2004).
199. Progress of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL. ASS. DOC.
(10250) (2004).
200. See id.
201. See id. During a 2004 Assembly discussion on the constitutional crisis
in Ukraine, several speakers warned against the Council introducing a "two-
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While the position of the Council may easily be explained
by the organization's desire to remain on favorable terms
with its older, wealthier members,202 who also make larger
monetary contributions"' to maintaining the organization's
large apparatus, the Eastern countries may be justified in
accusing the Council of hypocrisy.0 5 This, in turn, has a chill-
ing effect on the Eastern European countries' incentive to
comply with their commitments because they did not partici-
pate in the making of norms and these norms are being ap-
plied with unequal force among the different states.
Another example of the Council of Europe turning a blind
eye to noncompliance by Western states while closely scruti-
nizing Eastern states' performance is that of the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.2 6
France, one of the prominent Western European members of
the Council, has not yet signed this landmark treaty. 27 It is
all the more pertinent that France is among the Western
states with one of the largest presences of national minorities
in the population.2 08 By contrast, all of the Eastern European
member states of the Council have signed and/or ratified the
Convention.2 9 Many of these states have been the subject of
tier, two-speed system" resulting in the organization being "discredited" if it
failed to adopt the same criteria for Liechtenstein as for the new democracies.
The Council "would only maintain its credibility if it showed itself capable of
defending universal principles." Id.
202. Mainly the nations of Western Europe.
203. A member state's population and wealth are used as some of the main
factors determinative of that state's monetary contribution to the Council. See
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 25, at 9. Therefore, Western states, who
are substantially higher gross domestic product ratios than their Eastern coun-
terparts, contribute a larger share of the Council's support.
204. The Council of Europe's secretariat currently employs more than 1800
persons. The organization had a budget of 186,012,700 euros in 2005. See
Council of Europe at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/ (last visited May 1,
2005).
205. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77..
206. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, supra
note 35.
207. See EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1492) (2000);
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited Aug. 13,
2005).
208. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. ASS. REC. (1492) (2000); Johannes Willms, France
Unveiled: Making Muslims Into Citizens, at
http://www.opendemocracy.net/xml/xhtml/articles/1753.html (Feb. 26, 2004)
("the Muslim minority in France [is] the highest in the European Union at 3.26
million (5.5% of the population of mainland France)").
209. See Council of Europe at
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
repeated inquiries into the status of the national minorities
inhabiting their territories. 1' This kind of duality of stan-
dards has a very demoralizing impact on the Eastern states'
respect for the integrity of the Council's institution."'
V. PROPOSAL
The path to remedying the problem of the Eastern Euro-
pean member states' noncompliance with the Council of
Europe's agreements lies in the intergovernmental organiza-
tion's reexamination of its own mechanisms and structures.
If the Council of Europe wishes to witness improvement in
compliance on the part of its Eastern members, it should not
be content with merely pointing fingers at the violators. In-
stead, it must address the shortcomings noted above 12 after a
careful examination of its own structures, as well as of the
principles on which its treaties and conventions rest.
While the nonparticipation by the Eastern states in the
synthesis of norms and principles on which the Council's
rules and conventions are based. 2 cannot be undone without
turning the clock back on history, the focus should instead be
on addressing the more concrete set of problems."4 The
Council must end the practice of sending mixed messages to
its Eastern members, including the employment of confusing
and overlapping monitoring mechanisms and double stan-
dards in relation to different groups of nations.
With the proliferation of monitoring procedures of both
legal and political nature, it is essential that visibility and
clarity are maintained. The Council must adopt clear rules
governing the conduct of the various types of monitoring. It
must seek to terminate the duplication of its political moni-
toring procedures, as those are performed under the separate
auspices of its two organs, the Committee of Ministers and
the Assembly. The two bodies should immediately enter into
a constructive dialogue that would help clarify each other's
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm (last visited May 1,
2005).
210. See, e.g., supra Part II.B (discussing the post-monitoring dialogue of the
Council of Europe with Bulgaria on the subject of the national minorities' situa-
tion).
211. See Interview with Maria Spassova, supra note 77.
212. See supra Part IV.
213. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
214. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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purposes and procedures and ensure that no overlap occurs.
To address the ambiguity surrounding the post-
monitoring procedure, the Council should amend its Rules of
Procedure to add provisions detailing the precise manner of
conducting the post-monitoring dialogue. For example, it
should outline the precise procedural steps to be undertaken
by the Monitoring Committee in the event of a request to re-
open the monitoring procedure on a country involved in post-
monitoring dialogue.
To eliminate the use of dual standards with respect to
newer and older members, the Council should adopt resolu-
tions authorizing the Monitoring Committee to initiate moni-
toring procedures in response to noncompliance or violation of
commitments not only by its more recently acceded members
of the East, but also by its more prominent Western mem-
bers. For example, monitoring procedures should be opened
for Luxembourg and France for their noncompliance with the
Council's principles.215 This would serve to send a clear mes-
sage to the Eastern states that they are not treated differ-
ently, which in turn would have a positive effect on their ef-
forts to comply with the Council's guidelines.
VI. CONCLUSION
In seeking to remedy the problem of Eastern European
states' noncompliance with the international treaties and
conventions promulgated by the Council of Europe, we should
not end the inquiry by placing only the violating states them-
selves under the magnifying glass. A meaningful and com-
prehensive analysis of the problem entails examining the
very structure of the monitoring administered by the Council
of Europe and the normative basis on which it rests.
In addition to a myriad of internal factors that may be linked
to a state's noncompliance, it is difficult for an Eastern Euro-
pean country to observe legal norms in situations where it
was granted little or no opportunity to participate in their
creation, and the mechanisms implemented for their en-
forcement create confusion through overlap and application of
double standards. It is only by means of a careful examina-
tion and a thoughtfully planned revision"' of the Council of
215. See supra Part IV.
216. See supra Part V.
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Europe's mechanisms and practices that the problem of the
Eastern nations' noncompliance may be partially addressed.
That is one of the very first, most crucial steps that must be
taken if the vision of "One Europe "211 is ever to materialize
into something more than an elusive mirage.
Postscript: Since acceptance of this comment for publica-
tion, the Council of Europe has acknowledged some of the
problems associated with the current procedures, including
the confusion created by parallel monitoring mechanisms and
the different treatment afforded to long-term member
states.218 However, it remains to be seen what measures will
be undertaken in attempt to address these concerns in the fu-
ture.
217. See supra note 18. See also Joint Meeting Between the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, EUR. PARL
Ass., 25th Sess. 4 (Sept. 25, 2003) (discussing the topic of the challenges and
rewards to be faced on the path to building One Europe).
218. See Progress of the Assembly's Monitoring Procedure, EUR. PARL. Ass.
DOC. (10541) (2005)
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